book
Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology
Dewey, John. Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology. New York: Henry Holt, 1922.
Related concepts3 concepts
Concept
Correction
Correction names the lived work of narrowing the gap between what was assumed and what is actually happening. It becomes important whenever systems, beliefs, or coordination can drift while still feeling operational. It helps preserve shared reality and learning, but can fail when every correction spawns new framing instead of updated contact with conditions. It differs from repair because correction updates belief and behavior; repair addresses damaged standing and trust. It differs from revisability because correction is the act; revisability is the designed capacity to keep correcting.
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Concept
Judgment
Judgment names the capacity to decide when understanding is incomplete but harm, coordination, or responsibility will not wait. It becomes important whenever action must proceed under partial information and real consequence. It helps preserve proportionality, answerability, and room for revision, but can fail when judgment hardens into dogma, paralysis, or punitive finality. It differs from certainty because judgment accepts incomplete sight; it differs from preference because judgment weighs consequence beyond taste; it differs from optimization because judgment keeps contestability and human proportion in view; it differs from rule-following because judgment must still respond when rules lag reality.
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Concept
Thinking
Thinking names reflective interpretation, explanation, and deliberation made possible by enough stability, time, and distance from immediate constraint. It becomes important when coordination is secure enough that action can be accompanied by—or followed by—reflection on why, not only what. Thinking is not detached from action; it is a way of slowing response enough for judgment to form, for alternatives to be considered, for consequences to be imagined before they arrive. It helps preserve discernment, learning, and moral reasoning, but it requires conditions: distance from urgent threat, cognitive and social surplus, shared language for deliberation, and enough stability that questioning does not destabilize survival itself. Under severe pressure, coordinated action may precede explanation—people act together before they renegotiate why, and meaning accumulates later, if at all. Roles can precede reasons when constraint is visible; practices can work before they are explained; certainty can coordinate when explanation is too slow for the problem at hand. Thinking thins when scale or urgency removes the conditions it requires—when no one can trace harm, when managed doubt persists far from those who wait, when compliance replaces judgment because discernment has become too costly. The question thinking raises is: what must hold before there is time to think? Where is thinking a capacity scale has not yet removed? The counterbalance is to notice coordination before explanation without calling early arrangements irrational, to recognize thinking as conditioned by structure rather than absent by nature, and to ask what held long enough to live before asking what is true.
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